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ABSTRACT
In pursuit of responsible research and innovation (RRI), emphasis has
been on various forms of inclusion in the governance of science,
technology and innovation. Given that much of the ideas on
inclusion in fact refer to discursive inclusion, it is surprising that
little attention has hitherto been paid to what seems foundational
to any discursive space: ontologies (theories of being) and
epistemologies (theories of knowing), and notably how these
relate to inclusion and exclusion. By means of an action-research
case study on responsible innovation on biogasiﬁcation in rural
India, we show that one important mechanism of exclusion exists
in a dispossession of epistemological agency and the rendering of
ontologies as anomalous, even if this is not directly visible as
social exclusion. We argue that RRI should adopt as one of its
central values the epistemological empowerment of relevant groups.
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Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) has emerged as a vast science policy literature
that addresses amongst others the question of how to make governance of science,
technology and innovation (STI) more inclusive in terms of the publics they serve and rep-
resent, and more responsive to the dynamics and uncertainties that innovation inherently
entails (Macnaghten et al. 2014; Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe 2012; Von Schomberg
2013). Although this implicitly builds on the inclusion of knowledges other than formal
expertise, little attention has been paid in the literature to the challenge of reconciling
knowledges, when they are so far apart that they fail to recognize each other as valid
knowledge. This paper discusses how people can be empowered to contribute from
their own knowledge position, to processes of governance.
We take a constructivist, grounded approach to knowledge: rather than specifying a
theoretical account upfront, we call knowledge whatever actors refer to as knowledge.
We are thus open to a broad range of entities that may count as knowledge: the ‘stuﬀ’
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that scientists consolidate in journal papers, but also what craftspeople teach their appren-
tices in embodied, narrative and metaphorical ways. This way, knowledge is inseparably
connected to the ﬁrst-person perspective that an actor holds to the world: their knowledge
position.We take such a knowledge position to be rooted in an epistemology or conception
of what it takes for knowledge to be true or valid. This epistemology may remain implicit
in actors’ own accounts of knowledge.1 Only through recognition of such knowledge pos-
itions does it make sense to critically discuss the exclusion of knowledges.
The inclusion of knowledges is central to RRI, although we take the critical stance that
this inclusion is usually insuﬃciently substantiated in its conception of knowledge. Two
notions that circulate within RRI discourses, ‘inclusion’ and ‘responsiveness’ (Stilgoe,
Owen, and Macnaghten 2013), do in fact promote such knowledge inclusion. Inclusive-
ness does this seemingly straightforwardly. Responsiveness does so in a more instrumental
sense (Reed et al. 2009; Stirling 2007): with a broader knowledge base, governance is more
likely to be able to respond to the emerging challenges (Jasanoﬀ 2002, 379). Yet, seminal
publications (e.g. Von Schomberg 2011) do not elaborate the notion of inclusive delibera-
tion (see also Di Giulio et al. 2016). RRI can thus be understood as the next step in the
traditions of technology assessment (TA) and constructive technology assessment (CTA).
These sought input to STI beyond mere technological expertise, and proactively charted
the societal context in which STI would operate (Klüver, Nielsen, and Jørgensen 2016;
Rip, Misa, and Schot 1995). Yet, critique has been levelled against seeing RRI as the con-
tinuation of TA, for example, because it disregards the diversity in TA approaches (Delv-
enne 2017).
It is vital to distinguish social inclusion from epistemic inclusion. Social inclusion
amounts to ensuring that people have access to governance processes such that they
can contribute to discussions on an issue. This is hard enough: considerable economic,
social and political barriers may stand in the way for people to participate in these pro-
cesses. Still, warranting that people have access to sites of decision making is not the
same as granting that their knowledge will be received or exert any inﬂuence. Social
inclusion easily disregards the diversity in knowledge positions. Additionally, the
problem is reﬂexive: the boundary between social inclusion and epistemic inclusion is
itself constructed and connected to particular ontological and epistemological positions.
Regarding epistemic inclusion, the question is: how can a heterogeneous assembly2 of
actors be made to contribute meaningfully to processes of innovation and governance,
especially if they are divided by incompatible epistemologies? Granting people the
ability and authority to speak cannot be seen apart from the ability to speak from their
particular knowledge position. In exploring this problem, we coin the notion of epistemo-
logical trust for the ideal when parties recognize knowledges from alien epistemologies that
may seem nonsensical from their own epistemology.
It needs recognition that ‘inclusion’ is an essentially asymmetric notion. It presumes a
core site where knowledge is produced and decisions are made, and a periphery. Those
from the periphery can at best be ‘emancipated’ – an equally asymmetric and problematic
term – such that they can contribute to the governance process, or only be acknowledged
as voiceless, and at worst remain utterly invisible. This resonates with Haraway’s (1988)
notion of unmarked categories: members of dominant classes are privileged to deﬁne
the classes and how these matter, as well as to position themselves as exempt from classiﬁ-
cation. They in eﬀect position themselves as universal and neutral; as ‘unmarked’.
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We assume that epistemological divides stand in the way of empowering relevant
groups and entrusting them with the governance of STI. This points at a new value to
be realized in RRI, and governance of STI in general: the democratization of the validation
of knowledge (Visvanathan 2009). The knowledge positions that we assumed to be rooted
in an epistemology even if this is not a typical Western-scientiﬁc epistemology, need to be
enabled to demonstrate how their knowledge is true and valuable. If such democratization
is not in place, we should be pessimistic about the possibility of knowledge to deliver any
beneﬁts to governance and innovation in substantive, instrumental or normative ways
(Stirling 2007). This is not meant to disqualify scientiﬁc knowledge in favour of ‘alternative
facts’. But it does say that if science’s criteria for knowledge are applied to all knowledge
proper, important knowledges are lost only because they are of a diﬀerent form (see also
Fuller 2012; Guston 2013).
As a strategic research site to explore these issues, we investigate an innovation project in
biogas production from rice straw in rural India. The innovation problem has many sides.
First, there is the technology that is as yet insuﬃciently mature to function in the ﬁeld.
Second, there is the problem that currently most of the rice straw is burnt, causing
massive problems of air and soil pollution. The problem ramiﬁes wide and multiple
problem deﬁnitions circulate. Also, the relevant actors are heterogeneous. Therefore, it
cannot be taken for granted that all relevant knowledge can unproblematically be integrated
in the innovation process. We ﬁnd that, both socially and epistemologically, stakeholders
are not available by default (Pandey, Valkenburg, Mamidipudi, and Bijker, forthcoming).
From this case study, we propose an additional sensitivity to epistemic empowerment
that RRI needs to incorporate. Governance of STI needs to cope with the challenges emer-
ging from epistemological divides between actor groups. From our case study, it follows
that articulating issues that people can relate to and own as their responsibility, is on its
own insuﬃcient. It also takes eﬀort to bring incompatible epistemologies to the same
table. Translation is needed between them, and due attention must be paid to each.
Neither prioritizing between them nor exclusion of some is wise. And neither should
truthfulness be attributed uncritically to any of them.
Deliberation in a situation of epistemological divides
The naiveté of inclusive deliberation
One thread running through traditions of RRI, TA and CTA is the recognition that other
knowledges than formal expertise pertain to innovation processes, and that a broader
range of stakeholders is therefore to be consulted. Reasons for such consultation
include practical considerations to build a better overall knowledge base, to have a
better decision-making process, or to make decisions more democratically sound from
some normative, political-philosophical consideration (Bidwell 2009; Jauho 2016; Renn,
Klinke, and van Asselt 2011; Stirling 2007). In practice, such inclusion helps to broaden
the range of perspectives on a problem. If actors can bring their perspective to bear on
the issue, they are also more likely to recognize both the problem and its eventual solution
to be theirs. Also, as more knowledge from the context of operation – as a somewhat artiﬁ-
cial distinction from the context of research and development – is included, it is likely that
the implementation will be better adapted to that context.
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Whether or not stakeholders are in practice able to inﬂuence decisions may depend on
various factors, including systemic and spatial exclusion, racial and gender exclusion,
access to information, and socio-economic means (Teelucksingh and Poland 2011).
Also, parties may be excluded deliberately from such arenas (de Saille 2015). This social
inclusion has been addressed widely (see Fung 2003 for an overview).
In view of this diversity of causes for stakeholders to be absent as well as a diversity of
reasons why they should be present, it is remarkable that most approaches to stakeholder
inclusion are comparably uniform in their focus on deliberative methods (Stilgoe, Owen,
and Macnaghten 2013). According to Owen, Macnaghten, and Stilgoe (2012), RRI is about
‘making the right impacts’, which are to be determined through deliberative democracy.
Also, RRI’s imperative of being ‘responsive’ to the needs of society (Owen, Macnaghten,
and Stilgoe 2012) is highly predicated upon collecting those needs along deliberative lines.
Some criticism has indeed been levelled against the ‘deliberative default’ of stakeholder
inclusion. This approach, when applied uncritically, undermines the value of inclusive
deliberation at multiple levels. First, it generally reduces inclusive deliberation to a bureau-
cratic tokenism prescribed in standardized formats that are mechanistically performed in
order to move forward (Owen et al. 2013). Second, it obfuscates the ongoing power
struggles and eﬀorts (especially in the Global South, including India) to legitimize inclus-
ive deliberation as a tool to democratize governance of STI (Grunwald 2019; Ladikas and
Hahn 2019; Pandey and Hahn 2018). Third, it under-appreciates the normative as well as
practical capacities of exercises like TA to make a political impact (Grunwald 2019;
Hennen and Nierling 2019; Van Est 2019).
As Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten (2013) review, moves towards deliberative demo-
cratization can themselves be subject to framing eﬀects that reinforce existing power
relations, not least by constructing particular kinds of publics. Similarly, Van Oudheusden
(2014) argues that instead of naively assuming that deliberation will lead to better democ-
racy, it should be articulated how the rules of engagement themselves are negotiated, and
how inclusion and exclusion are achieved. The latter are now largely hidden under a see-
mingly non-political vocabulary deployed in RRI literature (Van Oudheusden 2014, 81).
Sand (2019) shows how the practice of inclusion (speciﬁc formats of visioning and ima-
gining and language of expression) might severely limit the enriching potential of delib-
erative exercises and may end up re-enforcing elite visions of S&T governance.
Research has provided reasons why deliberative processes fail. As Gregory (2016)
argues, deliberative inclusion easily escalates, ultimately compelling decision makers to
bypass the deliberation results. Mistaking quantity for quality, initiatives sometimes
only produce long lists of undiﬀerentiated concerns, little clariﬁcation and consultation
of expertise, and no sign of engaging in controversial issues. Similarly, Guston (2013)
shows how anticipatory deliberative processes are too much akin to the modus operandi
of the technosciences, and adopt technoscience’s tendency to approach the future as some-
thing to take control of. In general vein, Chilvers and Kearnes (2015) argue that existing
approaches often assume that the ‘public’ to be involved is somehow pre-existing and
available for enrolment.
Yet, as Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten (2013) argue, there have also been proposals to
repair these deﬁcits. It has been shown that many initiatives to deliberation do at least
produce desirable outcomes, even if not perfect. Also, Guston (2013) shows that despite
these epistemological hazards, it still proves beneﬁcial to amplify voices that would
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otherwise remain unheard. If technoscientists are made to discuss the matter outside their
own workplaces and outside their own modes of thinking, they are compelled to think
more explicitly about the normative sides to their work. This is presumably beneﬁcial,
even if no clear account is given of how these voices do represent speciﬁc ontological
and epistemological positions.
In a constructivist understanding of public engagement, the relevant public for a par-
ticular discussion is not preordained, but emerges in, or is constructed as a consequence of,
speciﬁc democratic processes (Michael 2009). It has indeed been articulated that delibera-
tion processes themselves construct and enact speciﬁc publics (Chilvers and Kearnes 2015,
33; Mitzschke 2018; Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten 2013, 5). Not only does any social-
scientiﬁc method to some extent create the social world it studies (Law 2009), but also
methods of public engagement might literally become ‘eventful’ and produce unforeseen
interactions among the public that go beyond merely harvesting their opinions (Lezaun
and Soneryd 2007). It cannot be assumed that the public is ‘out there’, waiting to be
included in deliberative processes (Mitzschke 2018).
This construction of publics is inevitably (also) epistemological. Deliberation is funda-
mentally dependent on the possibility of discourses to emerge, and shared ways of
knowing to be mobilized. If participants to a democratic forum mobilize narratives that
are too far apart, fruitful discourses will likely not emerge. One example is the language
of Punjabi farmers with its spiritual metaphors regarding the land. This stands in contrast
with the scientiﬁc language of innovators in New Delhi. This prima facie observation
makes one wonder whether and how a meaningful conversation between them could
emerge. Our educated guess would be that the innovation experts will draw the longest
straw concerning their ability to determine the terms of debate (Wynne 2001, 2003),
and that the farmers will face barriers to get the content of their knowledge recognized
(Pandey, Valkenburg, and Bijker submitted).
To the present case, a naïve implementation of deliberative participation would consist
of simply bringing farmers and corporate players to the same table, and let them discuss
the issue, as if this were enough to bring on board the perspectives of farmers. However,
this would disregard the speciﬁcity of rules of engagement between farmers and corpo-
rates, and the fact that the negotiation of these rules is contingent upon existing power
relations. The latter would put to question the possibility of the exchange of knowledge
to take place. This closely relates to the fundamental observation by Fuller (2012), that
certain knowledges not only acquire dominance, but also become the criterion by
which other knowledges are assessed.
Epistemologies are closely connected to ontologies, or ‘theories of being’: the way
persons know their world, rooted in an epistemology, is closely connected to how they
conceive of that world. For example, diﬀerent ontologies might order diﬀerently what
counts as practical knowledge and what counts as belief systems or ethics. Thus, if all
actors are to be treated fairly, the ontologies that order their world view need to be
taken into consideration. Being accounts of reality and the conditions of reality, ontologies
are tied up with how people intervene in reality, which makes the mobilization of ontol-
ogies political: ontological politics (Mol 1999, 2002). Acknowledging one ontology and not
another is a political act in its limitation of interventions (politics of ontology). In addition,
by performing particular ontologies, actors stake their territory and render holders of
other ontologies powerless (politics by ontology). Consequently, multiple ontologies
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exist at the same time, which, with Mol, we take to be more fundamental than a simple
coexistence of multiple perspectives or interpretations. As Barad (2007, 185) argues, ontol-
ogies, epistemologies, and their politics are inextricable, which is why she talks of ethico-
onto-epistemologies. Also, prioritizing ontologies and epistemologies has consequences,
including that knowledge exchange potentially becomes problematic. This will be
central to our case study.
The empowerment of publics requires that onto-epistemic diﬀerences are dealt with.
Including new stakeholders into deliberation should ultimately be about empowering
their epistemologies. Not only should people be enabled to speak, they should also be
able to do so in a way that presents their knowledge position as legitimate, and the epis-
temology in which their position is rooted as valid. This is what we call epistemological
agency. One element of the construction of publics, that has hitherto received fairly
little attention, is the mending of exactly these epistemological boundaries and epistemo-
logical agencies (see also Visvanathan 2009). Not only might there be no shared vocabu-
lary between parties, also the parties’ accounts of the world might be so divergent as to
prevent any shared recognition of problems and potential solutions. Moreover, dominant
onto-epistemologies may include a subordination of other epistemologies, thus silencing
the latter (see Cech et al. 2017 for a similar example).
Thus, a relevant actor is not only one who is de facto able to make a meaningful con-
tribution. This would disregard people who are excluded because of incompatible epistem-
ologies, or because ontologies are enacted that render them such. The realm of relevant
actors should also include those who can potentially make a meaningful contribution,
i.e. those who are able to propose an ontology.3 This points at a key element of stakehol-
dership: not only should people be formally entitled to make a contribution, they should
also be empowered to propose an ontology and to supply it with a validating epistemology.
Towards epistemological empowerment
Essentially, the problem we observe in the case study is that ontologies are enacted, in
tandem with their accompanying epistemologies, which hampers the free ﬂow of knowl-
edge. Given the heterogeneous and ramiﬁed nature of the innovation problem, we assume
that some degree of free ﬂow of knowledge would be beneﬁcial to arriving at a contextually
robust solution. In the remainder of this section, we present some thoughts about how to
achieve a freer ﬂow of knowledge.
The ﬁrst step is to recognize a paradox. On the one hand, we need to acknowledge that
multiple onto-epistemological positions exist. Also, we must assume that they are rational,
meaning that they are internally consistent and open to some form of critique, and that they
are therefore legitimate. On the other hand, accepting each and every fact stated by a legit-
imate epistemology as true would not bring us very far. Some of the facts stated by diﬀerent
parties are in contradiction, and even when facts are shared, they may be ranked diﬀerently
in importance among other facts. Also, there is no denying that plain ignorance and even
stupidity exist – only, as social scientists, we should avoid this explanation and only use it
as a very last recourse. (Also, caution is due as apparent stupidity and ignorance might
simply result from our own ontological and epistemological postitions, see Michael
2011). Thus, epistemic inclusion needs a strategy to strike a balance between granting
truth to positions and critiquing those positions. Our challenge is not primarily to assess
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each epistemology on its own quality, but rather to deal with the fact that not all epistem-
ologies and ontologies are equally positioned to critique other positions, as theymay lack the
agency to engage in the ontological and epistemological politics needed.
The second step is to work on either horn of the paradox. Recognizing the diﬀerent pos-
itions and their legitimacy requires that we articulate the boundaries between them and
respect these boundaries, to create a safe space for each actor to present their ontology.
Simultaneously, these diﬀerences, and the unequal distribution of epistemological
agency need attention. Here, subordinate positions require special care: without speciﬁc
support, they might not be able to present their knowledge in the broader arena.
The two sides of the strategy coincide with how Bijker, Bal, and Hendriks (2009) have
articulated the construction of expert authority, which is at the same time tied to principles
of democracy and inclusion, and to principles of expert knowledge making and seclusion.
They show that expertise needs at the same time public spaces where it is held accountable
(‘front stage’), and spaces where it can operate freely and bounded only by its own internal
criteria (‘back stage’). Thus, in fact, in these two types of space, diﬀerent criteria for validity
apply. In similar vein, the connection between diﬀerent epistemologies and ontologies
needs on the one hand modes of operation where mutual comparison and prioritizing
of elements takes place, and on the other hand spaces where they can be reﬂected upon
without questioning them.
In the following, we will interrogate the case of rice straw fermenting in rural India, and
identify barriers to stakeholder involvement that are produced through the enactment of
ontologies and epistemologies. These barriers may concern the enrolment, availability and
accessibility of stakeholders. They may also concern stakeholders’ eﬀective participation
once they arrive at the discussion table. We aim to move beyond social and institutional
barriers to participation, and focus speciﬁcally on the epistemic and epistemological
aspects of inclusion.
The case of rice straw fermenting in rural India
Case introduction
Currently, many farmers in India are working in the so-called rice-wheat system. This uses
farmland alternatingly to grow wheat and rice within a year cycle. After harvesting, the
farmland needs to be vacated of the straw before the next crop can be sown. Many
farmers currently burn the straw. This engenders various problems, including smog and
soil deterioration. One potential solution is envisioned: instead of burning, the straw
could be used in a biogasiﬁcation process. This would at once solve the smog and soil
deterioration problems, and produce gas as a utilizable energy carrier.
At face value, the innovation problem consists of improving the gasiﬁcation technology.
Current technologies are not yet suﬃciently capable of dealing with rice straw; it has too
much wood-like content, compared to other feedstocks. However, further complexities are
easily identiﬁed. For such a technology to become viable, more challenges would have to
be faced: adaptation of farmers’ processes to make the straw available, securing supply, to
reach an appropriate scale, warrants for long-term operation to attract investments, etc.
Ramiﬁcations of the problem thus abound, which connects it to a broad range of fram-
ings and problem deﬁnitions. Social inclusion and exclusion are immediately visible in the
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diﬀerential diﬃculties for groups to acquire access. We demonstrate how these diﬀerent
positions enact ontologies and epistemologies, and thereby enable and disable knowledge
to travel between the holders of those positions. Such barriers may be in place even if
access in a social or even physical sense seems to have been provided. In section 4, we
will report on the interventions we made.
Case selection and method
The case came to our attention originally as an innovation project, run by a large chemical
corporation, and arguably serving the needs of farmers. Given the positions of both the
corporation and farmers, it was by no means straightforward that collaboration
between them would unfold as fair and unproblematic. Thus, we as RRI researchers
were enrolled to provide a proper frame of thinking. We were to add social value, to
the value of technical and commercial expertise held by the corporation.
Our empirical data collection consisted of interviews and site visits, supplemented with
document research. We also conducted interventional research: by organizing events, we
explored possibilities to breed onto-epistemic trust between diﬀerent knowledge positions,
as a way of being symmetric to vulnerable stakeholders’ points of view.
The interviews were semi-structured, based on topic lists that contained a number of
themes: what people see as the main problem, what its possible solutions are, what
stands in the way for those solutions to materialize, and how they believe other
groups understand the problem. This allowed interviewees to explain their position in
their own terms. Also, reﬂection was solicited on the larger context, and the barriers
interviewees perceived to the possibilities of exchanging knowledge. Access to the inter-
viewees was acquired through snowballing, starting from contacts held by project
members. As it was vital to acquire a perspective as broad as possible, we did not
exclude any potential interviewee upfront. We deliberately sought to include at least
policy makers, academic scientists, corporate scientists, farmers (organic as well as
ones working in the rice-wheat system), and societal organizations working with
farmers.
The researched documents included academic papers, both social science and chem-
istry of biogasiﬁcation; news media coverage of both the straw-burning problem and inno-
vations related to it; and policy documents relating to agriculture and innovation. Most of
the material was available online or brought to us, for example by interviewees. We started
at these topics that were self-evidently relevant to our research, and the search was not
guided by speciﬁc concepts or strategies.
By means of intervention, we brought together actors and stakeholders that had not
been together in a deliberative setting. We co-organized one Farmers’ Day where about
100 farmers from various agricultural paradigms convened and exchanged knowledge
regarding local solutions to the burning of rice straw. And we held three workshops
where corporates, farmer representatives, innovators, academics and policy makers con-
vened to discuss potential collaborations. We participated in one key state policy
meeting on converting rice straw waste to biofuel. While we pursued a modest stance
with respect to imposing our conclusions, we did share our own knowledge and insights
to oﬀer a contrasting view and invite further reﬂection. As these events were hetero-
geneous – each in a diﬀerent way – they typically produced a dynamic that was of great
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interest from an RRI perspective. To all events, we invited key people from relevant social
groups, but all events were also publicly advertised and generally accessible (except the
meeting with corporate researchers, which was in-company).
From the interviews, site visits and interventions, data was collected using audio and
video recordings (if possible). Extensive notes were made of interviews, visits and
events, in most cases by multiple researchers. Thus, the interpretation of the interviews
was corroborated through intersubjectivity. Within our material, we looked for principal
themes we had selected upfront. These included diﬀerent framings of straw and the
chances and challenges it oﬀers; ideas of knowledge, its assessment and its hierarchies;
the ways people understand and evaluate technologies (exemplars as well as generic
ideas of ‘technology’); and how people conceived of social groups, social relations, and dis-
tribution of power. The notion of trust, as developed further on in this text, emerged
inductively out of the analysis, and was not something we probed on the basis of our
own a priori conceptions.
Smoke, straw, soil degradation, and squandering
The problem of biogasiﬁcation ﬁrst appeared simple, even though there was nothing trivial
about the technology. Yet, it seemed simple in the sense that the relevant actors and pur-
poses appeared clearly. A big corporation was working on a technology for which they
needed to enrol farmers to make it viable, and where it seemed desirable to put this col-
laboration under a regime of responsible research and innovation.
The technology itself is far from simple. In fact, some problematic parts of the gasiﬁ-
cation process have remained insurmountable at the time of writing. Upon our ﬁrst
explorations, the problem proliferated into a network of many problems, including
issues of farmers’ livelihoods, problems of gender inequality, and problems of soil and
air pollution. We ﬁrst discuss this broader network of problems, temporarily privileging
our own perspective and suspending the actors’ perspectives. We then gradually move
into the diﬀerent perspectives and problem deﬁnitions the actors hold, which we will
rearticulate in the next subsection in more conceptual terms of onto-epistemological
positions.
India has had a long history with biogas. One narrative trope ﬁrmly rooted in Indian col-
lective memory is that of the history of biogas as going back to 1897. A biogas digester was
created then that used human waste as a feedstock. In 1939, a digester was successfully con-
structed that produced biogas from manure (Abbasi, Tauseef, and Abbasi 2012). When dis-
cussing biogas, whether with individual interviewees or in workshop-like discussion settings,
this history often surfaces. Given that huge amounts of rice straw and wheat straw are – argu-
ably – currently left unutilized, the thought of making it into biogas and thus adding green
energy to the national energy balance is never far away either. However, the technology to
use rice straw as a feedstock is not mature enough for large-scale rollout.
A ﬁrst source of complexity appears when we inquire where people reckon the straw
comes from. The dominant agricultural paradigm in the areas in point is the aforemen-
tioned rice-wheat system, which was an important driver of the Indian Green Revolution.4
Between two crops, farmers need to empty their ﬁelds of residues to vacate them for the
next cycle. Setting the residues to ﬁre is often considered the only viable solution. For these
farmers, biogasiﬁcation would not solve their actual problem of emptying the ﬁeld.
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Instead, it would force unto them the chore of collecting the straw and availing it for gasiﬁ-
cation. Also, they have no need for electricity or gas as both are already provided at little or
no cost.
Here, the problem connects to another generally acknowledged problem: the thick
plumes of smoke that cover large swaths of North India, including the capital Delhi,
twice a year. The burning is mostly concentrated in the states of Punjab and Haryana,
but it also happens elsewhere in the country. The smoke is highly toxic, and it causes
serious health issues among people. Burning of straw has been prohibited by law, but
enforcement is problematic, and found unjust by farmers who claim to have no choice.
The burning is also detrimental to the soil, as it exterminates beneﬁcent microorgan-
isms living in the soil. In addition, some organic farmers argue that the straw contains
important nutrients that should rather be redeemed to the soil to serve the next crop
cycle. In this light, biogasiﬁcation is a non-solution: even if it produces utilizable gas, it
takes away nutrients. This also complicates the claim to renewable energy beneﬁts: proces-
sing straw into gas would not be without cost, as it is simply not a ‘valueless non-commod-
ity’, despite it being burnt at large scale. Organic farmers see biogas as a competitor to a
healthy agricultural ecosystem.
These aspects are mobilized in diﬀerent constellations by diﬀerent actors. While we
introduced the problem as ‘the challenge to make biogas from rice straw’, this is not
necessarily the form in which it appears as relevant for each of the actor groups. Our inter-
viewees are connected through many diﬀerent smaller and bigger problems. Not only do
they give diﬀerent accounts of what the problem is and how it matters, they also disagree
on possible solutions, and on who is responsible for constructing those solutions.
Staking ways of knowing
During our investigation, we encountered multiple ways of knowing the problem. To some
extent, these are simply diﬀerent perspectives. Insofar as they stem from factual disagree-
ments, further research – whether driven by formal expertise or by other practices of ‘truth
ﬁnding’ – could probably bridge the divides. However, some positions appear more fun-
damentally apart than can be bridged by an act of (mutually recognized) truth ﬁnding. In
this section, we zoom in on two of those positions. The perspective of organic farmers is
fundamentally diﬀerent from the perspective of those we call the ‘core network’5 of inno-
vators: corporate and academic scientists and policy makers. This notion of core network
suggests an opposition to ‘periphery’, and indeed we aim to show that these core-network
actors have an implicit bent towards marginalizing the farmers who they in fact need to
enrol. In terms of the framework developed above, they manage to position themselves
as the unmarked category, and their epistemology as the gold standard by which the
others are evaluated.
Despite the heterogeneity of this core network, there are some storylines that consist-
ently recur from the various actors. As these storylines are mobilized in roughly the same
strategic direction, the core network functions as a discourse coalition (Hajer 1995; 2005,
302). One narrative trope recurring from the core network is the equation of straw with
waste. This suggests that it has no intrinsic cost, and that making it available only requires
establishing a supply chain. This storyline of ‘straw as waste’ is pervasive (see for example
Kauldhar and Yadav 2018; Kumar 2018).
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At ﬁrst glance, this understanding of straw as waste seems concurrent with the perspec-
tive of farmers working in the rice-wheat paradigm. As mentioned above, the straw is pri-
marily something that these farmers need to get rid of. Even when recognizing the soil
degradation that results from the burning, for many farmers it does not outweigh the
beneﬁts of timely sowing the next cycle. This is ampliﬁed by the fact that multiple state
policies incentivize the rice-wheat system. However, at closer look, the story line also
downplays the eﬀort that farmers would have to make to collect the straw. It instrumen-
talizes farmers: they only appear as suppliers of straw, not as owners of knowledge.
When biogasiﬁcation becomes an option, burning straw consequently becomes a waste
of material. Throughout India, it destroys a tremendous amount of biomass. In view of the
impending need to green the energy balance, capturing the energy available in biomass
and feeding it into the energy system would oﬀer a great step forward. While this view
ascribes a certain monetary value to straw, thus de facto elevating it from the waste cat-
egory, it does also straightforwardly entail that farmers should collect the straw for
biogasiﬁcation.
This core network deeply depends on promises of technological innovation. In the
glory days of the green revolution, new technologies did indeed prove capable of
pushing the limits of what a passive ‘nature’ aﬀords to produce. A certain dependence
on Green Revolution programmes, together with trust generated through these pro-
grammes and policies, has brought exactly that: a comparably stable income and a
secure procurement through state-run food security programmes. Trust between
farmers, scientists, and the State was bred through the eﬀorts of the State, and state-run
extension programmes introduced green revolution technologies through their scientists
in Krishi Vigyan Kendras (Farmer Science Centres).
One ﬁnal thing that the storylines in this discourse coalition share is a preference for
higher levels of abstraction and organization: the tremendous amount of biomass that
is available at the national level as if that were simply available, the conceptual narrative
of a ‘supply chain’ that sounds much more clear-cut than its implementation in the ﬁeld
would be, a generic trust in ‘technological innovation’, etc. Thus, to this discourse
coalition, local decentralized solutions will appear as anomalous, and irrelevant to
solving the bigger problems of clean energy and energy security. Consequently, systemic
players such as big corporates and policy actors will be more relevant than individual
farmers. And most importantly, it entails a prioritization of formal expertise and a subor-
dination of the knowledge held by farmers – if not a complete rejection.
The second discourse coalition we discuss centres on organic farming. Contrary to the
core network of innovators, members of this coalition see straw as a resource of essential
nutrients, to be given back to the land for the next crop cycle. This can take the form of
either a mulch sheet, or of ploughing the straw back into the soil. The maxim of organic
farming is that you reap only from the land what you really need, i.e. the edible parts of a
crop. Everything else should be given back, so as to stimulate recovery in the soil. Organic
farming maintains an overall philosophy that is strongly aimed at a long-term, circular
ecological balance (Pandey et al. submitted).
The organic farmers see soil as the capital that is to be preserved for the future. They
emphasize the need to return nutrients to the soil, and the need to give the soil time to
recover. Burning the straw is to squander nutritional value and to kill the organisms
that make a healthy soil. As organic farmers already put the straw to use, it is not
JOURNAL OF RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION 11
waste, and it is not available for biogasiﬁcation. Rather, biogasiﬁcation would mean: com-
peting for the resource that provides nutrients. This vision thus conﬂicts with the one held
by the core network. Interestingly, the core network promises that biogasiﬁcation provides
manure as well. While sensible from a core-network point of view, this latter position does
not ﬁt in the organic-farming ontology, centred on an arguably natural ecosystem. Given
the social and epistemological relations as explained in this paper, this renders the organic
farmers irrational or ignorant.
Organic farmers have a whole repertoire of ways to make sense of the value and con-
dition of the soil. For example, they manually check which organisms such as worms and
insects are present in the soil. They check what the soil looks and smells like, and what its
texture and solidity are like. If they can roll a pellet from the soil, this signiﬁes a healthy
degree of moisture.
Organic farming maintains diﬀerent ideals than does farming in the rice-wheat system.
With organic farming, the ideal is a situation of ecological balance on the farmland, which
is believed to provide the greatest possible resilience. This future is thus independent from
technological promises and the uncertainty that comes with them, as is the case with the
promises made by the core network. This entails that trust is not put on high-level formal
expertise, but on community and tradition: much of the knowledge needed to attain this eco-
logical future, organic farmers argue, is already available in traditional practical knowledge.
Moreover, some organic farmers express the fear that once biogas becomes commer-
cially attractive, it will lead to further instrumentalization of the land. It will stimulate
further extraction of bio-value from the land. Thus, in their paradigm, there is no place
for commercial biogas plants: while they give back something, they do not give back as
much as the organic way of farming does.
The organic farmers have a clear account of how they ‘know’ the land. They do not use
the word ‘epistemology’ when explaining how they know things, but when asked, they
usually have an explanation of how their knowledge is valid. Also, they often present
their way of knowing in explicit opposition to the ways of knowing held by the core
network. Members of the core network, according to the organic farmers, only know
nature in ways that instrumentalize it and rob it of its good.
Thus, the organic farmers denounce the core network of innovators in a speciﬁc, episte-
micway: they see the core network as advocates of irrelevant and even evil knowledge. At the
same time, organic farmers themselves experience that the core network of innovators are
deaf and blind towards the knowledge they, organic farmers, hold dear. They typically
reason along the lines that their organic-farming knowledge is unattractive to the core
network because it would not entail a businessmodel for corporates.Hence it becomes unat-
tractive to see the truth in it. Above all, the organic farmers see their ways of being and their
ways of knowing the land as permanently under pressure from the greater powers behind
the Green Revolution and the rice-wheat system, namely the core network. (This is the
view our informants attributed to the core network, not necessarily actually held by the
core network. Also, it is not universally accepted, see, e.g. Jamwal 2018.)
Epistemological divides
We thus identiﬁed two principal ontologies and accompanying epistemologies. It is tempt-
ing to think of these as diﬀerent versions of the same problem, that only place emphasis on
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diﬀerent parts of the problem and balance competing interests diﬀerently. However, the
fundamental ramiﬁcations of these positions provide compelling reasons to think of
them as in fact representing diﬀerent realities, with diﬀerent problems and diﬀerent poten-
tial solutions. The problems have diﬀerent owners and diﬀerent parties responsible for
their solution. They have diﬀerent causes and diﬀerent eﬀects. Thus they are pockets of
knowledge that are in important senses incompatible.
In addition, it becomes clear that the core network indeed positions itself as the
unmarked category. However, this does not appear as an explicit move of stating that
the organic farmers are ignorant or irrational. Instead, it happens through the presentation
of the innovation space as a speciﬁc distribution of epistemological agency and task div-
ision: the main problem is deﬁned as technical and thus stays with the core network, and
the periphery is rendered responsible only for putting in place a supply chain. Compared
to the technical innovation, the challenge of the supply chain appears as merely organiz-
ational and not scientiﬁc or technological, even if it may in practice not be all that easy.
The subordinate position of organic farmers speaks from the fact that even though they
have an explicit account of the knowledge position of the core network, they see no possi-
bility to challenge it. To echo Visvanathan (2009), they have no possibility of critiquing the
knowledge position of the core network. Also, the fact that they have such an explicit
account is already diﬀerent from how the core network is positioned, as the latter
seems to have no substantive account of the knowledge position of the former. This is
again concurrent with the core network’s unmarked position. The organic farmers there
only appear as suppliers of straw, not as holders of knowledge.
RRI as breeding onto-epistemological trust
Our intervention aims
In addition to analysis, we have actively engaged with the respective practices. In the
course of the 1.5 years of the project, our primary concern converged to the creation of
onto-epistemological trust: seeking arrangements where knowledges can be presented as
true and rational, even among members of incompatible ontologies and epistemologies.
This includes that people should be enabled to present reﬂections on how they know
things, and explain how their knowledge is valuable. In this section, we discuss and criti-
cally appraise our attempts at this.
Our interventions
We pursued circulation of knowledge at the Farmers’ Day, the two two-day workshops
(one between State, NGO actors and social scientists and the other between social scien-
tists and engineering scientists), one workshop between corporate actors and social scien-
tists, and participation in a policy meeting with multiple actors working on bio-ethanol
production. We sought to bring parties together that represented diﬀerent ways of
knowing the problems listed above. We approached them as groups with particular
onto-epistemological positions, even though they are in fact not internally homogeneous.
We explored what was needed for knowledge to circulate and for integrated solutions to
come about, and how we could promote this.
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The Farmers’ Day consisted of a relatively homogeneous group. This is not to say that
all farmers think alike, and there were even diﬀerences of understanding that could be
reckoned ontological: e.g. seeing straw as waste versus seeing straw as a resource. None-
theless, there was enough common ground for a fruitful exchange of knowledge to take
place, without one type of knowledge (or one agricultural paradigm that the knowledge
was connected to) gaining dominance. In contrast, the other workshops we held were
more heterogeneous and came with more controversy.
To illustrate the very idea of knowledge circulation in heterogeneous contexts, in some
of the events, we used examples from practices that are not clearly connected to the
context of biogasiﬁcation. Drawing on other cases of innovation from earlier research,
we exempliﬁed how knowledge travels, how it works diﬀerently in diﬀerent contexts,
how it is diﬀerently evaluated. For example, one of us presented on the basis of earlier
research how handloom weavers connect to other parties, and how the knowledge they
exchange, moves between categories during the exchange: from ‘traditional’ to ‘chemical’
to ‘embodied’ to ‘practice-based’, etc. (Mamidipudi 2016). Another example was the smart
metre controversy in the Netherlands, where privacy concerns of consumer citizens
proved to be anomalous to knowledge systems deployed by the designers in charge (Valk-
enburg 2017). We explicitly staged those examples in a vocabulary of diﬀerent ways of
knowing that each have their validity and usefulness.
In the workshop with corporate actors, our presentations inspired participants to reﬂect
on how issues of social responsibility remain prone to becoming an externality to the core
business of proﬁt making. Similarly, in the meeting between engineering and social scien-
tists, research students struggled with the dominance of academic and corporate inno-
vation paradigms over local knowledge systems, which the media pejoratively referred
to as ‘cow science’. Comparing handloom and biogas as socio-technical practices
allowed young engineering researchers to explore vocabularies that looked at cultural
aspects of organic farming knowledge that are generally considered as an externality to
modern innovation frameworks. In most cases, we saw that further reﬂection upon
people’s own ontologies and epistemologies became possible.
Our attempts at breeding onto-epistemological trust should be seen as experiments in
epistemological inclusion, as a speciﬁc part of inclusive deliberation. By ﬁrst recognizing
boundaries of expertise between groups, validating such expertise by other epistemic
groups in the various settings, and collectively examining externalities generated in each
of those domains of knowledge, reﬂexivity as well as circulation of knowledge across
boundaries was achieved.
Intervention results
In our public meeting, clearly a front stage, farmers responded to accusations by citizens
and policy makers from the city of Chandigarh of ﬂouting of environmental laws. They
explicated how farmers do not make the problem alone, but so do the state and citizens
who are not willing to pay for the added costs of environmentally safe food production.
Standing up to the authority of environmental laws, they rejected the criminalization of
farmers, and instead asserted their role as the producers of the food that the country
needs so badly. In eﬀect, farmers here appeared as experts. Media members in the audience
applauded their stand, and even asked why they had been silent for so long. This is thus a
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shift in the broader perception of rice straw burning as a criminal activity attributed to
farmers, towards a common recognition of economic and environmental vulnerabilities
associated with the various farming paradigms. This shows that once it is recognized
that authority is a relational thing, and the right eﬀort is made (and allowed to be
made) to establish this relation, it can change.
Similarly, lack of epistemic authority undercuts organic farmers’ conﬁdence in talking
about their own innovations and expertise. At multiple other instances, in heterogeneous
settings like these, organic farmers often demand the scientiﬁc experts to study and vali-
date their knowledge claims to make them more commonly acceptable. The disconnect
between their knowledge systems and knowledge systems external to their practices also
causes them to mistrust technologies that are promoted by the state and large corpor-
ations. Yet, in the farmers meeting, encouraged to speak of innovations at individual
farm level that ameliorated burning of rice straw, farmers demonstrated evident technical
expertise. Their knowledge was validated in the meeting itself and accepted. As the
meeting progressed, peers evaluated interventions, and responded by clamouring for
the mobile telephone number of the one who proposed a particularly eﬀective solution.
In the absence of authoritative expertise that could overrule their local expertise, the emer-
ging onto-epistemic trust validated their own technical knowledge, and allowed organic
farmers to become more nuanced about the utility of technology in general as well as
the relative worth of their knowledge.
We observed that the multiplicity of problems was a loyal ally in our aim to keep the
discussion open, and in preventing the discussion from becoming dominated by particular
knowledge positions. Even though participants at times really stuck to their positions, we
managed to keep the dialogue open, and no actor acquired onto-epistemological domi-
nance to silence others. We used this productively by initiating discussions that made
visible the externalities of all frames and problem deﬁnitions, creating opportunities for
reﬂexivity with respect to actors’own frames.
A recognition of the need to connect diﬀerent epistemicworlds was reﬂected when, during
the policymeeting, a key policymaker cautioned against keeping agriculture and energy con-
texts separate. Rather, considering their interwoven economies, both realms had to be con-
sidered – whether at the local or at the national level, and would require the state
departments of energy and agriculture to talk to each other on joint policy making. This
requires mechanisms that build onto-epistemic trust through collaborative problem-
solving. Rather than dismissing farmer concerns as irrelevant to energy security, epistemic
authority needs to be rearranged such that their solutions are recognized as knowledge.
Concluding remarks
RRI seeks to broaden the input to governance of innovations. We showed how this broad-
ening needs to include the challenging of epistemological dominance. Shaping RRI in a
context where epistemological and ontological divides seem insurmountable requires
further eﬀort to ensure stakeholder inclusion at the epistemological level. It is vital to
create safe spaces where diﬀerent positions can meet, without any of them acquiring a
dominant position and imposing its particular knowledge criteria onto others. This we
consider true diversity: a structure that equally empowers diverse epistemologies. This
is a value for democracy in general, and for the governance of STI in particular.
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Our case study shows how deliberation as the main approach to democratizing research
and innovation ultimately requires an eﬀort to bring stakeholders into existence as actors
and as epistemic and epistemological agents. Being a responsible researcher may include
taking up the challenge of explicating the epistemic and ontological claims of those who
are otherwise only constructed as stakeholders in the dominant scientiﬁc, policy and
market frames. While it has been argued that deliberation is by no means a panacea (Chil-
vers and Kearnes 2015; Van Oudheusden 2014), we show that such hurdles are not only
about diﬀerent levels of expertise and socio-political inclusion, but also about inclusion
of ontologies and epistemologies.
From our limited explorations, it remains speculative to what extent people in our bioga-
siﬁcation case have fundamentally revised their positions, and what epistemological divides
have been bridged. We need to reckon with the possibility that people just acted ‘in a socially
desirable way’, rather than critically revisiting their own epistemologies. However, even if this
is the case, it still seems that a proper facilitation contributes to a participative democracy that
is more conducive to symmetric epistemic relations amongst diverse actors.
The onto-epistemological divides we articulated add to existing divides of underlying
socio-economic and class conﬂicts. This is one point at which the distinctly Indian perspec-
tive of our case study adds weight: as seems common in India, it unfolds at the crossroads of
modern, Western-style innovations, and traditional practices and knowledges. This brings
together fundamentally diﬀerent ideals of democracy and inclusion as well as innovation
and knowledge. Not only is the latter understudied in RRI and adjacent ﬁelds, it is also
that such western studies are not by default receptive for Indian philosophies, which may
for example reject a strict separation between facts and norms (Sarukkai 2009).
We contend that, apart from these Indian speciﬁcities, socio-economic and class diﬀer-
ences per se are insuﬃcient to explain the boundaries we encountered. Onto-epistemologi-
cal diﬀerences are indispensable in explaining why there might in fact never emerge a
single problem deﬁnition. In addition, in line with ideas on intersectionality (Cooper
2016), it should be assumed that such diﬀerent systems of inclusion and exclusion
reinforce and interlock one another. Thus, enabling people to challenge hierarchies of
knowledges might also destabilize such interlocked inequalities, and hence contribute to
empowerment and equity in a more generic social sense. Building onto-epistemological
trust might connect groups that would otherwise remain divided by class diﬀerences
and other social barriers.
Finally, in contrast to the framing of straw as waste and as an externality to the system
of Green-Revolution farming, organic farmers do have a long-term perspective on where
innovation should go. They pursue prosperity through their relational view to ecology,
with cyclicity and equilibrium as central principles. That their caring for ‘Mother Earth’
does not ﬁt well with core-network’s frames should not be seen as disproving their knowl-
edge, but rather as a point of critique to be directed at innovation leaders: instead of dis-
crediting it, innovation needs to open up its own ontological and epistemological
presumptions and allow for alternative ones to speak up.
Notes
1. At this point we ﬁnd ourselves limited by our own Western position, and we disregard the
possibility that people do not evaluate their own knowledge in terms of truth and a justifying
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epistemology, see, e.g. Leach and Davis (2012). We deem this unproblematic for the current
argument, and resolving it would be beyond the current scope.
2. We speak of assembly here, as alternative notions such as ‘group’ or ‘community’ suggest
some form of internal coherence, which is exactly what is missing here, at least at the
onto-epistemological level.
3. Even though made at a very diﬀerent level of analysis, this point takes inspiration from
Jansen (2017), who proposes a similar correction to actor-network theory.
4. We use Green Revolution in the distinctly Indian meaning of the term, referring to the tech-
nology-driven agricultural boom that the country witnessed in the second half of the Twen-
tieth Century. Our use of the term is unrelated to other uses, such as e.g. the one deployed by
Mazzucato, Semieniuk, and Watson (2015).
5. This notion obviously takes inspiration from the notion of ‘core set’ (Collins 1981),
which was meant to refer to those scientiﬁc experts that are able to contribute to
a certain controversy, because of their knowledge as well as their institutional situ-
ation. The ramiﬁcations of this concept are not considered relevant for the current
argument.
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